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A B S T R A C T
The offshoring phenomenon has evolved in recent years, and can be understood from a threefold perspective:
first, the evolution in the type of activity being offshored; second, the learning curve involving both the com-
panies implementing offshoring and service providers; and third, the reasons for offshoring. This study proposes
an empirical framework that will allow us to explore the interaction between the type of activity (specifically
knowledge-intensive) and the drivers of the decision to select the most appropriate governance mode. Specifi-
cally, our results show that market-seeking drivers become the primary determinants prompting firms to offshore
knowledge-intensive activities through a captive center. In contrast, the motivation to reduce costs moderates
the decision to offshore knowledge-intensive activities by nurturing a preference for offshore outsourcing. The
empirical evidence is supported by multi-country data from the Offshoring Research Network.
1. Introduction
Offshoring service activities has evolved significantly over the past
twenty years. This practice was initiated with the clear objective of re-
ducing costs and involved those activities considered administrative or
very repetitive, albeit also of increasing importance in large corpora-
tions. It involves transferring these activities to countries with lower la-
bor costs. However, over the years both those companies implement-
ing offshoring and service providers have been learning, changing and
evolving (Lewin and Volberda, 2011). One aspect of this evolution in-
volves the type of activities being delocalized, passing from simple and
repetitive administrative activities to more knowledge-intensive ones
(Gerbl et al., 2015; Lewin and Peeters, 2006; Linares-Navarro et al.,
2014; Manning et al., 2008; Musteen, 2016; Zhao and Calantone, 2003).
The growing tendency is for companies to offshore more value-adding
and more complex activities, requiring access to a larger number of
qualified and skilled workers (Jensen et al., 2013; Lewin and Peters,
2006; Linares-Navarro et al., 2014).
This evolution has changed the criteria used to select the most ap-
propriate governance mode for each activity. Offshoring has evolved to-
ward activities that are more knowledge-intensive, and therefore more
complex, strategic and even confidential, with the increasing use
of captive offshoring versus offshore outsourcing governance modes.
Previous literature suggests that the offshoring of those knowledge-in-
tensive activities that are essential for the firm's competitive advantage
should be closely monitored (Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011; Lewin et al.,
2009b; Zhao and Calantone, 2003).
At the same time, the evolution of these processes and the experience
and learning companies have acquired have led to a change in their rea-
sons for offshoring (Contractor et al., 2010). Companies have therefore
changed from being cost-centric to other types of motivation that are
more strategic in two main ways: on the one hand, the absence of tal-
ent in the country of origin or the excessive cost of that talent has made
companies look for new talent abroad. Demand and cost are clearly
interrelated, although there is a trend toward a motivation associated
more with the lack of resources than with pure cost (Lewin and Peeters,
2006; Manning et al., 2008). In the specific case of knowledge-intensive
activities, for example, there is another interesting and growing trend
for outsourcing these types of functions (Amendolagine et al., 2014;
Contractor et al., 2010) with the aim of increasing flexibility and gain-
ing access to specialized resources, even though such activities are usu-
ally considered of strategic importance and represent core capabilities.
On the other hand, the development of emergent countries and the in-
creasing importance of these markets inform other even more strate-
gic reasons associated with deployment in those countries: first, devel
⁎ Corresponding author.
Email addresses: carmen.paz@uc3m.es (C. Paz-Aparicio); fmunoz@emp.uc3m.es (F. Muñoz-Bullón); mariajose.sanchez@uc3m.es (M.J. Sáanchez-Bueno); JERicart@iese.edu (J.E.
Ricart)
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pursup.2018.10.001












C. Paz-Aparicio et al. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management xxx (2018) xxx-xxx
oping products and services adapted to those countries’ circumstances,
and second, developing markets that are not only potentially inter-
esting in themselves but also because of the organizational learning
acquired through competing more efficiently in challenging markets.
Therefore, apart from costs (Brouthers, 2002; Brouthers and Brouthers,
2003; Brouthers et al., 2003), there are other reasons associated with
the hunt for resources (Bertrand, 2011; Bunyaratavej et al., 2011;
Contractor et al., 2010; Lewin et al., 2009b) and the development of
new markets (Contractor et al., 2010; Lewin and Peeters, 2006).
Considering this evolution from different perspectives (evolution in
the type of activities, in the learning of offshoring companies and in ser-
vice providers, as well as in the reasons for offshoring) that occur si-
multaneously or, coevolve, it seems appropriate that a decision of such
importance as selecting the governance mode needs to be based on the
joint interaction of the type of activities and their drivers. Specifically,
one of the most challenging decisions facing international companies in-
volves selecting the most appropriate offshoring governance mode de-
pending on the type of activity being offshored (Choi and Contractor,
2016; Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011; Linares-Navarro et al., 2014; Luo
et al., 2013) as well as responding to their desire to access distinctive
resources (e.g., qualified and skilled personnel, and new technologies),
reduce competitive pressure, or obtain cost savings, among other mo-
tivations (Lewin and Peeters, 2006; Mudambi and Venzin, 2010). Nev-
ertheless, previous research reveals that the effects the type of activity
and the reasons for offshoring have on the choice of governance mode
still remain unclear from a joint perspective. Hence, in this paper we
analyze the moderating effect drivers have on the governance mode de-
cision when offshoring knowledge-intensive activities. In particular, we
suggest that the drivers of offshoring may be a key factor for determin-
ing how the nature of the activity being offshored influences the choice
of governance mode.
From an empirical point of view, we use data from the Offshoring
Research Network (ORN), an international research initiative launched
at Duke University's Center for International Business and Research
(CIBER), which involves partner universities in Europe and Asia. All the
data from the ORN have been gathered during the period from 2005 to
2011 and cover offshored service activities.
The main contributions our study makes to existing literature can be
summarized as follows. To begin with, our study follows the main lines
suggested by the literature (Bunyaratavej et al., 2011; Caniato et al.,
2015; Elia et al., 2014; Gooris and Peeters, 2014; Hutzschenreuter et al.,
2011; Kedia and Mukherjee, 2009; Lewin et al., 2009b; Linares-Navarro
et al., 2014; Luo et al., 2013; Rilla and Squicciarini, 2011; Roza et al.,
2011), and extends the state-of-the-art by providing new insights on the
relationship between the type of activity being offshored and the choice
of governance mode. Accordingly, we analyze how the impact the type
of activity offshored has on the governance mode may be shaped by
the reasons (or drivers) for offshoring. In our analysis, we posit that the
relationship between knowledge-intensive activities and an internalized
offshoring mode will be stronger in the case of market-seeking reasons.
In contrast, we also propose that resource and cost drivers weaken the
positive association between the offshoring of knowledge-intensive ac-
tivities and a captive governance mode. Our study therefore develops
and empirically tests a relationship in the offshoring phenomenon that
combines the nature of offshoring activities with governance modes and
drivers. This is an important issue for international business, as it con-
stitutes a fruitful research stream. To the best of our knowledge, this is
a significant gap in the literature that our research seeks to fill.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets out the theoretical
framework used to test our hypotheses and explains our contribution.
Section 3 describes the data, the variables, and the empirical method
used. Section 4 describes the main results. Finally, Section 5 discusses
the main findings and describes the study's contributions and implica-
tions, its limitations, and topics for future research.
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses
Prior studies have traditionally sought to understand why firms off-
shore (e.g., Caniato et al., 2015; Lahiri and Kedia, 2011; Lewin et al.,
2009a; Lewin et al., 2009b; Roza et al., 2011), and the most appropriate
governance mode based on different criteria (e.g., Gooris and Peeters,
2014; Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011; Luo et al., 2013). Several questions
have thus been explored, such as the influence of specific factors (e.g.,
location-specific factors, firm size, transaction costs, and cultural deter-
minants) on the offshoring governance mode selected for each imple-
mentation (e.g., Contractor et al., 2010; Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011;
Roza et al., 2011), or the performance implications of the choice made
(captive offshoring versus offshore outsourcing) (e.g., Elia et al., 2014;
Larsen, 2016; Leiblein et al., 2002; Rodriguez and Nieto, 2016).
In particular, while exploring the offshoring phenomenon, different
relationships may be proposed between the type of activity and the pre-
ferred governance mode (Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011; Linares-Navarro
et al., 2014; Luo et al., 2013). As previous literature has stressed, the
type of activity offshored has an impact on the governance mode in-
volved (Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011). This work states that firms decide
on the governance mode based on the specific settings of a particular
implementation, thereby suggesting that the type of activity will influ-
ence the governance mode selected. Linares-Navarro et al. (2014) con-
tribute to this topic by stating that the governance mode selected de-
pends on the type of activity, differentiating between core and non-core
activities. Other authors (Luo et al., 2013) report that the choice of gov-
ernance mode is affected by and aligned with transactional attributes
and process integration requirements.
In addressing this topic, and based on prior literature, we consider
two implementation models: an internal one, which is also referred to
as in-house or captive offshoring, and an external one, referred to as off-
shore outsourcing (Contractor et al., 2010; Elia et al., 2014; Hätonen,
2009; Kedia and Mukherjee, 2009; Lewin and Peeters, 2006; Lewin and
Volberda, 2011). As Kuntz and Roberts (2014: 253) have stated, “in in-
ternal offshoring, organizations establish captive centers (i.e., overseas
subsidiaries fully owned by the organization and comprising a group of
skilled professionals on location), while in external offshoring (offshore
outsourcing) the organization hands control of specific business func-
tions to foreign providers”.
Considering the type of activity, when information security is high
for a specific offshored activity, the company will be more uncertain
as regards the behavior of the offshore vendor, being particularly wary
of opportunistic behavior (Luo et al., 2013). This is the case of knowl-
edge-intensive activities, which usually call for more process integration
between the service provider and its customer, implying that a captive
mode would be more appropriate. The evidence indicates that as infor-
mation security increases or becomes more relevant and the integration
between the vendor and the client is important, companies tend to se-
lect a captive mode (Luo et al., 2013). Hutzschenreuter et al. (2011)
suggest that some governance modes are more suitable than others de-
pending on the functions being offshored. Choosing an inappropriate
governance mode may threaten the outcome of the offshoring effort,
and especially so in critical or core activities (Linares-Navarro et al.,
2014) such as knowledge-intensive ones, as they usually include intel-
lectual property and represent critical competencies. As knowledge-in-
tensive activities are likely to be highly strategic for the firm, involve
confidential information and embody core capabilities, firms will then
be reluctant to outsource them (Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011). In view
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than an outsourcing governance mode when delocalizing such activities.
Additionally, the reasons and governance choices involved in off-
shoring have long been considered a key research topic in this matter
(Lewin et al., 2009a), so focusing on these issues is pertinent. With ref-
erence to drivers in offshoring, the prevailing convention has been that
the main driver for offshoring business processes is to achieve cost sav-
ings through labor arbitrage. However, Lewin and Peeters (2006) and
Contractor et al. (2010) report a remarkable evolution in more strate-
gic drivers such as firm growth, improving services, and gaining access
to more qualified personnel, as increasingly important objectives induc-
ing companies to undertake offshoring activities. Accordingly, we con-
sider the reasons involving market-seeking (i.e., part of a larger global
strategy and access to new markets), resources (i.e., gaining access to
qualified personnel offshore and improving service levels) and cost (i.e.,
labor costs and other cost savings) related to the likelihood of imple-
menting offshoring, as these are the main drivers usually discussed in
the literature (e.g., Lewin et al., 2009b; Roza et al., 2011). The work by
Hutzschenreuter et al. (2011) analyzes the effect that cost, market-seek-
ing and growth drivers have on the choice of governance mode, al-
though it does not consider resource drivers. We therefore contribute to
previous research by examining how offshoring drivers moderate the re-
lationship between the nature of the activity being offshored (in partic-
ular knowledge-intensive activities) and the corresponding governance
modes.
2.1. Drivers underlying the offshoring of knowledge-intensive activities
Specifically, and based on previous literature (e.g., Contractor et al.,
2010; Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011; Lewin et al., 2011; Linares-Navarro
et al., 2014; Manning et al., 2011), we have divided offshored service
activities into two groups: knowledge-intensive and administrative. The
former, such as R&D and product development and design (among oth-
ers), involve symbolic analytic work and are typically more complex
and require more highly skilled personnel than administrative activities,
which are often referred to as back-office operations and are usually
considered peripheral to core competencies (Lewin et al., 2011). Off-
shoring implementations initially focused on administrative service ac-
tivities, but they have gradually been including more value-added ser-
vice activities, such as knowledge-intensive ones (Jensen et al., 2013;
Lewin and Peters, 2006; Linares-Navarro et al., 2014).
Some of the main studies on the relationship between offshoring dri-
vers and the choice of governance mode are described in Table 1, with
all of them analyzing these issues from different perspectives than in our
study.
As previously propounded, offshoring companies may be doing so
for different reasons, which are grouped into three types and can be
understood according to three different theories. Based on transaction
cost economics (Musteen, 2016; Williamson, 1993; Zhao and Calantone,
2003), when firms offshore one or more of their activities, perhaps
looking for lower labor costs in the host country, they need to decide
whether they should outsource (market) or keep the activity internal-
ized as a way of minimizing transaction costs. Overall, the main benefit
of offshoring involves cost advantages (by adding operating and transac-
tion-based costs) due to more economical talent and facilities. Neverthe-
less, although cost savings have traditionally been proposed as the main
driver for explaining offshoring decisions and international mode choice
decisions (Brouthers, 2002; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2003; Brouthers
et al., 2003), recent discussions highlight additional motivations, in-
cluding access to highly skilled human resources or new technologies
(Bunyaratavej et al., 2011; Contractor et al., 2010; Lewin et al., 2009b).
From the perspective of the resource-based view of the firm (Barney,
1991; Gilley et al., 2004; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Zhao
Table 1
Literature review on drivers and the governance mode of offshoring.
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and Calantone, 2003) a company's capabilities depend on its resources.
The emphasis is on the resources the company requires to improve or
maintain its competitive position, focusing on efficiency-seeking and
knowledge-seeking motives (Roza et al., 2011). This theory highlights
the importance of resources while leading firm action. Furthermore,
managing a firm's portfolio of resources and capabilities is the main
concern of a firm's strategy (Jacobides and Winter, 2005). From this
perspective, offshoring is informed by the accessibility to, for example,
qualified personnel or capabilities for redesigning the business process
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ing labor costs and accessing global talent pools are two different ap-
proaches driving companies to initiate offshoring. Looking for talent
is usually linked to companies involved in innovation and product-de-
velopment activities, while saving on labor costs is related to compa-
nies seeking to replace high-cost workers (generally low skilled) with
lower-cost workers.
Likewise, another theory largely applicable to offshoring is the mar-
ket-based view (Jahns et al., 2006; Priem and Butler, 2001), whose rea-
soning has sometimes been identified with entrepreneurial theory (Roza
et al., 2011). The main argument now is that offshore locations may
also become important customer markets in the future, so offshoring
will also be driven by market-seeking purposes. From this perspective,
companies might see offshoring as a market-related strategic necessity,
allowing them to access new markets, increase their speed to market,
and even provide differentiation advantages over competitors (Jahns et
al., 2006).
The offshoring phenomenon has become an increasing trend in in-
ternational business as a means to expand firms’ operations abroad
(Bertrand and Mol, 2013; Brouthers and Hennart, 2007; Kedia and
Mukherjee, 2009; Lee and Lieberman, 2010). Within this trend, a re-
search stream attracting the interest of scholars focuses on how off-
shoring can be used as a strategy to create value (Lewin and Peeters,
2006; Mukherjee et al., 2013). Choosing the appropriate offshoring gov-
ernance mode is an important decision, mainly in firm-critical func-
tions such as knowledge-intensive ones. As previously described, knowl-
edge-intensive activities are of strategic importance for firms and are
considered high value-added activities involving confidential informa-
tion and representing core capabilities (Luo et al., 2013). Thus, off-
shoring activities are no longer seen as an operational tool for saving
costs but instead have become activities with strategic importance. This
new trend therefore influences the way companies design their global
activity network (Contractor et al., 2010). Therefore, our baseline is
that firms offshoring knowledge-based activities will do so preferably
through a captive governance mode. However, the motivation to off-
shore will moderate this relationship. The following sections explore the
drivers in offshoring as factors that may moderate the relationship be-
tween the nature of the activity being offshored and the preferred gov-
ernance mode.
2.2. Knowledge-intensive activities and choosing the governance mode: the
role of cost drivers
Offshoring traditionally involves companies seeking lower operating
costs, which become even lower when companies outsource the activ-
ity (Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011; Roza et al., 2011; Bertrand and Mol,
2013) although that implies higher transaction costs depending on the
nature of the activity being offshored, the service provider's reputation,
etc. Companies aim to reduce the sum of both transaction and operating
costs as far as possible. In the case of simple and non-strategic activities,
operating costs prevail as transaction costs tend to be minimal. As ac-
tivities become more sophisticated, transaction costs increase, so even if
operating costs are lower, captive offshoring may be the preferred gov-
ernance mode and better control the increase in transaction costs. In
line with this, previous literature shows that more knowledge-intensive
activities are usually kept under tight control and performed internally
through captive centers (Linares-Navarro et al., 2014).
The basic driver of offshoring, namely, cost advantage due to
cheaper labor and facilities outside the home country, is a key reason
for implementing an external governance mode. Offshoring operations
driven by a cost reduction motive generally include relatively simple,
routine and standardized tasks (Jensen and Pedersen, 2011). These are
often governed in outsourcing mode with an arm's length relationship
between companies, and thus with low inter-firm integration (Jensen
et al., 2013). This logic pushes those companies seeking to reduce costs
to outsource the function to an external provider, with the sole pur-
pose of becoming more cost effective. They tend to offshore outsource
to minimize costs due to the supplier's specialization, the achievement
of economies of scale and economies of learning, or the smaller invest-
ment required in comparison to a fully owned subsidiary in a foreign
country (Caniato et al., 2015). Offshore outsourcing provides a possible
pathway to price reduction and greater flexibility, permitting companies
to transform fixed costs into variable ones (Ellram et al., 2008).
As previously described, efficiency-seeking reasons for offshoring are
associated with the possibility of saving on wages and operating costs,
and so a captive governance mode may not be the most suitable op-
tion for relocating activities abroad. We thus propose that the relation-
ship between the offshoring of knowledge-intensive activities and the
use of a captive governance mode may vary if offshoring is driven by
reasons of cost reduction. When firms decide to offshore knowledge-in-
tensive activities with the aim of reducing costs, they may not have the
ability to exploit these high value-added activities themselves, and so
need to obtain specialized knowledge, such as the managerial and tech-
nological experience of external partners. In contrast to the risk of los-
ing a knowledge advantage through the need to share assets and skills
with a host partner, the relocation abroad of knowledge-intensive ac-
tivities driven by a cost reduction may allow obtaining the advantages
of independent foreign suppliers through scale economies, for example
(Amendolagine et al., 2014; Caniato et al., 2015). In the last decade,
alliances and agreements with external providers have proliferated, to
some extent because sources of technological knowledge are broadening
beyond the internal capability of even large corporations, and the rise in
R&D costs prompts sharing the expenditures and risks of R&D activities
(Choi and Contractor, 2016). This implies that the positive relationship
between offshoring knowledge-intensive activities and a captive gover-
nance mode will be reduced in the case of cost-reduction offshoring dri-
vers. Considering the previous arguments, we formulate the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Offshoring knowledge-intensive activities is less posi-
tively related to the likelihood of choosing a captive governance mode
when driven by cost motives.
2.3. Knowledge-intensive activities and choosing the governance mode: the
role of resource drivers
Our second scenario involves companies delocalizing their activities
that are driven by factors related to seeking resources abroad. Gain-
ing access to highly skilled workers is one of the reasons for an off-
shoring strategy in the case of value-added activities (Bunyaratavej et
al., 2011). From this perspective, offshoring is informed by the accessi-
bility of qualified personnel or capabilities for redesigning the business
process (Lewin and Peeters, 2006). In this front, we can identify two
forces of contrary signs.
On the one hand, offshoring implementations driven by the search
for resources and knowledge involve high asset-specificity, and pre-
sent challenges to tacit knowledge and its exchange, with a risk of
knowledge leakage (R. Mudambi and Tallman, 2010; S.M. Mudambi
and Tallman, 2010; Petersen et al., 2010). Therefore, offshoring as a re-
source strategy involving knowledge-intensive activities suggests that a
captive mode is preferred to relocate activities in international markets.
Given the nature of knowledge-intensive activities (tacit and complex)
and the risks associated with offshore outsourcing (e.g., dissipation of
knowledge), firms may decide to relocate domestic human resources
in their own subsidiaries, and thus safeguard valuable know-how and
avoid the uncertainty due to the supplier's potentially opportunistic
behavior (Luo et al., 2013), or other transaction costs. Under these
circumstances, they will be more careful when outsourcing the task
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the company. Companies in this situation will be more willing to re-
tain ownership of the activity abroad, thus creating a captive center
(Manning et al., 2008).
On the other hand, we need to consider two recent research streams.
First, we have learned about the evolution of service providers, which
initially focused on serving global clients from low-cost countries have
been investing in locations closer to their clients to cover both nearshore
and offshore services. With the increasing availability of competent ex-
ternal service providers that have gained specialized experience, firms
may be more and more attracted by the possibilities that offshore out-
sourcing offers in terms of reliance on external capabilities (Ellram et
al., 2008; Manning et al., 2011), which are key resources in foreign
markets. This notion has already been propounded by Abraham and
Taylor (1996), who suggest that companies might decide to outsource
specialized services if the work is complex and the contractor has more
resources and experience in performing that activity. This means that
companies conducting offshoring driven by resources may be willing
to rely on outsourcing not only because knowledge is more and more
complex and specific, and service providers are more and more spe-
cialized, but also because outsourcing is less expensive and less risky
than captive, due to high internal organization costs (Brouthers and
Brouthers, 2003; Manning et al., 2011) and because companies can pro-
tect themselves from knowledge leakages risks, through the adoption
of complex and extended contracts, by building long-term partnerships,
by relying on reputation effects, by sharing non-core knowledge or by
sharing core-knowledge and using the "mutual hostage" effect (Madhok,
1997). Consequently, there is support for concluding that greater ex-
perience with sophisticated and demanding external suppliers provides
offshoring companies with more possibilities to advance the value chain
into higher-end roles (Youngdahl and Ramaswamy, 2008; Youngdahl et
al., 2010).
Second, there are other authors who in turn suggest that the offshore
outsourcing of R&D activities leads to more positive innovation out-
comes (Bertrand and Mol, 2013) and also has a positive impact on orga-
nizational learning (Calantone and Stanko, 2007). Additionally, several
studies have described the importance of outsourcing the R&D function
for exploiting firm-specific capabilities abroad (Lewin et al., 2009b), ar-
guing that local R&D capabilities are used to adapt existing products to
local needs.
Accordingly, regarding the previous arguments about the more ap-
propriate governance modes when being driven by resource motives,
there is evidence to show that knowledge-based activities such as R&D,
engineering, and product design (Lewin et al., 2009b) will be increas-
ingly offshored via an external governance mode (Amendolagine et al.,
2014; Contractor et al., 2010).
Therefore, when offshoring knowledge-based activities driven by the
search of resources and capabilities we have two alternative arguments.
As tacit knowledge may be involved, captive should be preferred, but at
the same time outsourcing can be supported by the evolution of service
providers both in their reach to valuable knowledge and in their increas-
ingly effective coordination and integration mechanisms, as well as by
the introduction of diversity and differential knowledge to the new rela-
tionship. We believe that the second set of arguments should dominate
in the moderation effect. Considering these arguments, we propose the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Offshoring knowledge-intensive activities is less posi-
tively related to the likelihood of choosing a captive governance mode
when driven by resource motives.
2.4. Knowledge-intensive activities and choosing the governance mode: the
role of market-seeking drivers
Our third scenario involves moderating the decision on the gover-
nance mode, for the specific case of offshoring knowledge-intensive ac
tivities, involving market-seeking factors. A company may consider that
delocalizing the activity will help in terms of implementing its mar-
ket strategy. Potential offshore locations are not only supplier markets,
but can also be considered customer markets in the future. We consider
the following arguments in order to support a positive moderator effect
when considering market-seeking motives.
Firstly, market-seeking as a motive to offshore is related to access-
ing new markets. Access to the market requires the development of new
capabilities and expertise that can only be developed by being close to
the customers, understanding their idiosyncratic characteristics, and re-
sponding to their specific needs. As direct contact may be very relevant
to drive this learning, firms will tend to lead more towards captive off-
shoring.
Secondly, but of course related to the first argument, the company
may want to increase their speed to market, while sustaining a differ-
entiation advantage over competitors. In this context, the offshore out-
sourcing governance mode is still less appealing for avoiding the risks of
transferring important firm-specific knowledge to service providers, and
thus maintaining a firm's knowledge advantage (Caniato et al., 2015;
Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011) while the direct contact facilitates faster
learning and capability development.
As a result, when a company decides to offshore a knowledge-based
activity in order to access new markets the company may prefer an
internal governance mode. Within this context, a captive governance
mode allows firms to minimize their dependence on external providers,
get closer to the customers, and retain greater control over the core
competencies that enable them to achieve their market goals.
We therefore argue that while the offshoring preference for an in-
ternal (captive) governance mode for knowledge-intensive activities has
been well established, this effect is amplified when offshoring for mar-
ket-seeking reasons. We thus propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. Offshoring knowledge-intensive activities is more posi-
tively related to the likelihood of choosing a captive governance mode
when driven by market-seeking motives.
Fig. 1 summarizes the research framework for the main variables
used here.
3. Research method
3.1. Data and sample
The ORN is an international research initiative launched at Duke
University's CIBER that involves partner universities in Europe and Asia.
Since 2004, it has been studying major offshoring drivers, risks, loca-
tion choices, delivery model choices, performance indicators, and future
plans, based on annual client and service provider surveys. The ORN
database includes 1990 US and European client firms and more than
700 service providers. ORN's overall objective is to track, both annually
and over several years, the offshoring of administrative and technical
functions, from pioneering early adopters to majority adopters (Lewin
and Peeters, 2006). The survey has helped the ORN to create the first
firm-level database with information on when each company started off-
shoring a particular business function, where it was offshored, the ser-
vice delivery model used, and why. Survey items are answered for each
offshore implementation – that is, every function offshored in one par-
ticular location – and not for the company as a whole. This provides
much more precise insight.
Our sample is taken from the ORN Corporate Client Surveys con-
ducted in the US and Europe from 2005 to 2011. Service functions are
classified into admin services, call centers, product design, engineering
services, finance and accounting, human resources, legal services, mar-
keting and sales, procurement, R&D, and software development. Our











C. Paz-Aparicio et al. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management xxx (2018) xxx-xxx
Fig. 1. Research framework for the main variables. Note: Solid arrows represent a direct relationship. Dashed arrows represent a moderated relationship.
value chain's primary functions) because it does not share the same dri-
vers as services offshoring, and is thus different in terms of incentive
structures, as outputs are easier to measure, and offshore centers can
be organized as profit centers. The final sample consists of 664 offshore
implementations during the observation period. All the companies in-
cluded in the sample were conducting offshoring at the time the sur-
vey was administered (Larsen et al., 2013; Manning et al., 2011; Roza
et al., 2011). We did not include companies considering offshoring, as
their answers may have been influenced by their lack of experience in
offshoring.
3.2. Measurement of variables
3.2.1. Dependent variable: captive governance mode
Despite the growing importance of offshoring decisions in prior re-
search, the concepts “offshoring” and “outsourcing” are still often used
synonymously in the literature, and there seems to be consensus on
the need to differentiate them (Bunyaratavej et al., 2011; Kuntz and
Roberts, 2014; Lewin et al., 2009b; Lewin and Volberda, 2011). In this
sense, and for our purpose here, we will follow the work by Lewin et
al. (2009b), Contractor et al. (2010) and Schmeisser (2013), defining
offshoring as the process of sourcing and coordinating functions across
national borders, whereas outsourcing denotes the delivery of products
or services by an external provider. Outsourcing can be undertaken at
home or abroad, and entails an organizational restructuring of some ac-
tivities. When a company in another country is involved, the correct
term is “offshore outsourcing” (Kedia and Mukherjee, 2009).
Our dependent variable is dichotomous, taking the value 1 if the off-
shoring implementation is governed internally (i.e., captive offshoring)
and zero if it is governed externally (i.e., offshore outsourcing) (see,
e.g., Manning et al., 2008). Firms may offshore outsource to a domestic
partner, an international party, and/or a local one if they apply more
than one of these, or if they only report outsourcing. In turn, captive
offshoring firms retain full control over overseas operations (see, e.g.,
Roza et al., 2011).⁠1 Given the dummy nature of the dependent variable,
the empirical models developed to test our hypotheses are estimated us-
ing a binary logit estimator (this model is the most widely used discrete
limited dependent variable model in management literature; Hoetker,
2007)
3.2.2. Independent variable: type of offshored activity
The different activities were divided into knowledge-intensive ones
(engineering services, R&D, and product design) and the rest (admin
1 This definition of the dependent variable refers only to wholly owned subsidiaries
(e.g., Kuntz and Roberts, 2014), and therefore does not consider joint ventures as a captive
governance mode.
services, call centers, finance and accounting, human resources, infor-
mation technology support services, knowledge services, legal services,
marketing and sales, procurement, and software development). Our
classification is based on the work by Lewin et al. (2009b) and Manning
et al. (2011), who identify knowledge-intensive activities and refer to
them as product development or innovation activities.
3.2.3. Moderator variables: the offshoring drivers of cost, resource and
market-seeking motives
We now consider the following reasons for offshoring activities,
which are called drivers in the ORN survey. The importance of the nine
different drivers used in the survey was investigated using a five-point
Likert scale. The nine items were subjected to principal components
analysis (PCA). Prior to performing PCA, the suitability of the data for
factor analysis was assessed. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olin value was 0.759,
exceeding the recommended value of 0.6 (Kaiser, 1970, 1974), and
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity (Bartlett, 1954) reached statistical signifi-
cance, supporting the factorability of the correlation matrix. PCA re-
vealed the presence of three components with eigenvalues exceeding 1,
explaining 11.83%, 17.02% and 34.68% of the variance, respectively.
An inspection of the scree plot revealed a clear break after the third
component. Using the Cattell (1966) scree test, the decision was made
to retain three components for further investigation. The three-compo-
nent solution explained a total of 63.53% of the variance. Varimax ro-
tation was performed to help interpret these three components. Table 2
displays the rotated solution, indicating the loading within components.
The main loadings on component 1 are Other cost savings and Labor cost
savings. The main items on component 2 are Business process redesign, Im-
proved service levels, and Access to qualified personnel. Finally, the main
items on component 3 are the following four items: Increasing speed to
market, Access to new markets, Part of a larger global strategy, and Differen-
tiation strategy. Thus, Table 2 supports three categories of offshoring dri-
vers (cost, resource, and market-seeking, respectively) and is consistent
with previous research (e.g., Roza et al., 2011). This analysis provides a
clear picture of each driver's significance in the three components. Items
with primary loadings above 0.40 and cross-loadings below 0.40 were
retained (all the items in this case).
3.2.4. Control variables
As regards the control variables, we first control for experience
in offshoring (Bunyaratavej et al., 2011; Musteen, 2016). The com-
parative costs of hierarchical and contractual governance modes may
change as firms accumulate this experience. We therefore include a vari-
able that reports the number of a firm's past offshoring implementa-
tions (Gooris and Peeters, 2014; Jensen, 2009). Second, we also con-
trol for cultural distance (Ambos and Håkanson, 2014; Hutzschenreuter
et al., 2011, 2016). A major risk perceived by companies with off-
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Table 2



























− 0.0605 0.8071 0.0364
Increasing speed
to market
− 0.0192 0.1988 0.7232
Access to new
markets
− 0.1777 0.0527 0.7949






shoring may help to solve the conflicts arising from the integration
of two different cultures. This control variable was measured using a
five-point Likert scale with the question: “how important are cultural
differences with employees in offshore locations in the decision to off-
shore this function?” Third, firm size is used as a control variable in
line with previous works showing that size influences offshoring activ-
ities (Boehe, 2010; Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011; Roza et al., 2011).
We measure this variable as the logarithm of the number of employ-
ees working for the firm in the home country. Fourth, the time (in
years) between the launch of the first offshoring project and the initi-
ation of the focal implementation allows controlling for the age of the
offshoring implementation (Larsen et al., 2013; Lewin et al., 2009b).
Fifth, the location of the offshore implementation is used as a control
variable because this decision affects offshoring activities (Lewin et al.,
2009b; Luo et al., 2013; Roza et al., 2011). Importantly, property rights
systems and other legal frameworks in a host country appear to be in-
creasingly relevant to the choice of offshoring governance mode. With-
out sufficient legal protection, a firm's property rights such as trade-
marks, brand names, expertise, patents and copyrights will be exposed
to possible infringements and unlawful use by local firms. In such cir-
cumstances, the firm may have to use a captive mode. We use the fol-
lowing dummy variables as a control: Africa, Asia, Australia, Canada,
China, Eastern Europe, India, Latin America, Middle East, Philippines,
Russia, United States, and Western Europe. Sixth, since the home coun-
try affects entry-mode decisions (e.g., Gooris and Peeters, 2014; Hennart
and Larimo, 1998: Henisz and Delios, 2001; Mayrhofer, 2004), we
control for the firm's home country through a series of binary vari-
ables (the United States, Belgium, the Netherlands, Scandinavia, Spain
and the United Kingdom). To control for industry effects, we created
dummy variables for the following industries: finance and insurance,
government, manufacturing, media, professional services, retail, soft-
ware, technical services, and transportation. The governance mode cho-
sen may vary depending on the type of industry (Lewin et al., 2009b;
Luo et al., 2013). The Appendix A provides the definitions of the vari-
ables used.
4. Results
Panels A and B in Table 3 provide the summary statistics of the vari-
ables used in the analyses and their correlations between each other,
respectively. Panel C presents several differences of means tests that en-
able us to check whether knowledge-intensive and non-knowledge-in-
tensive activities differ from each other in terms of the characteris-
tics considered in the regression analysis. The correlation data suggest,
for example, that the choice of the captive governance mode is posi-
tively associated with the offshoring of knowledge-intensive activities
and the market-seeking drivers for offshoring. In contrast, a captive gov-
ernance mode is negatively correlated with the cost driver. In addi-
tion, knowledge-intensive activities are offshored particularly by firms
with more experience in past offshoring implementations. To assess
Table 3
Summary statistics, correlation matrix, and descriptive analysis.
Panel A: Summary statistics Panel C: Descriptive analysis by type of activities







1. Knowledge-intensive 0.300 0.458 0 1 (1) (2) (1)–(2)
2. Captive governance mode
(1 = yes)
0.453 0.498 0 1 0.398 0.583 -4.447***
3. Cost driver 0.064 1.028 -3.177 1.088 0.188 -0.227 4.85***
4. Resource driver -0.002 1.039 -2.664 1.792 0.013 -0.038 0.592
5. Market-seeking driver -0.114 0.986 -1.938 1.795 -0.276 0.267 -6.721***
6. Size 7.331 3.114 0 12.737 7.822 6.184 6.394***
7. Cultural distance 2.873 1.101 1 5 2.858 2.909 -0.552***
8. Experience in offshoring 7.241 5.468 1 22 6.935 7.955 -2.207**
9. Age of implementation 6.211 8.081 1 41 6.146 6.362 -0.315
Panel B: Correlation matrix
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1. Captive model (1 = yes) (1) 1.000
2. Knowledge-intensive (2) 0.170*** 1.000
3. Cost driver (3) -0.185*** -0.104*** 1.000
4. Resource driver (4) -0.023 0.046 0.043 1.000
5. Market-seeking driver (5) 0.253*** 0.238*** -0.028 0.352*** 1.000
6. Size (6) -0.241*** -0.047 -0.059 0.248*** 0.170*** 1.000
7. Cultural distance (7) 0.021 -0.005 0.033 0.137*** 0.031 0.179*** 1.000
8. Experience in offshoring (8) 0.086** 0.199*** 0.257*** 0.212*** -0.092** 0.174*** 0.065* 1.000
9. Age of implementation (10) 0.012 0.226*** 0.173*** 0.097** -0.230*** -0.134*** 0.086** 0.567*** 1.000
Notes: (i) Source: ORN dataset; (ii) ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively; (iii) to save space, the descriptive statistics on industry and location
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any multicollinearity problems, we have computed the variance infla-
tion factor (VIF) in each one of the estimated models. The VIFs are con-
sistently below the cut-off value of 10.0, which indicates that multi-
collinearity is not a major problem in our analysis (Hair et al., 2010).
Table 4 presents the results of the regression analysis for testing
our hypotheses. Model 1 is a base model that reports the results solely
for the control variables; Model 2 includes the direct effects that both
knowledge-intensive activities and offshoring drivers have on the gov-
ernance mode; in Models 3, 4 and 5 interactions between the knowl-
edge-intensive activities and each offshoring driver are introduced one
by one; finally, Model 6 includes all the interactions (moderator vari-
ables) between knowledge-intensive activities and the offshoring drivers
(cost, resource, and market-seeking drivers). Given that a single firm
might be involved in more than one offshoring implementation, stan-
dard errors are adjusted for clustering at firm level.
We now discuss the control model and the model with the direct ef-
fects before turning to each one of the hypotheses concerning the mod-
erator effects. In Model 1 (Table 4), the coefficient for size is significant
and positively related to a captive mode (β= 0.211, p < 0.01), in line
with previous studies (Boehe, 2010; Roza et al., 2011). The coefficients
for professional services, software industry and technical services are
also significant and positively associated with an internal governance
mode.
Model 2 in Table 4 reports the results for the direct effect of knowl-
edge-intensive activities on the governance mode in offshoring, as well
as the effects of the offshoring drivers. Thus, a knowledge-intensive
dummy variable was added for testing our baseline argument. The base-
line argument postulated that the impact of knowledge-intensive activi-
ties on a captive mode for offshoring practices is positive. In this sense,
the estimated coefficient of this dummy variable is statistically signif-
icant (β= 0.649, p < 0.01), and so we are in line with previous stud-
ies (Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011; Linares-Navarro et al., 2014). Because
knowledge is an intangible asset that is tacit in nature, when an activity
is knowledge-intensive there is a higher threat of imitation and a greater
need for protecting the intellectual property involved. These are funda-
mental determinants of a firm's decision to engage in captive offshoring.
Models 3, 4 and 5 in Table 4 report the results for the moderator ef-
fects of offshoring drivers (cost, resource, and market-seeking drivers)
on the relationship between knowledge-intensive activities and the gov-
ernance mode. In each model, one interaction between knowledge-in-
tensive activities and the corresponding offshoring driver has been in-
troduced.
Model 3 (Table 4) includes the interaction between knowledge-in-
tensive activities and the cost driver variable to determine whether
cost-saving drivers affect the positive association between knowl-
edge-intensive activities and the likelihood of choosing a captive gover-
nance mode. The estimated coefficient is negative and significant, thus
offering support for H1 (β= -0.611, p < 0.01). This result suggests that
in the specific case of cost savings, the offshoring driver is a key fac-
tor for determining how the nature of the activity being offshored influ-
ences the choice of governance mode. This is relevant to the extent that
even for knowledge-intensive activities, which have traditionally been
kept under tight control (Lewin et al., 2009b), companies may decide to
outsource this type of function with the aim of reducing costs.
In addition, H2 proposes that resource drivers weaken the positive
relationship between offshoring knowledge-intensive activities and an
internal governance mode. In model 4 (Table 4), the estimated coeffi-
cient of the interaction effect between the variable Knowledge-intensive
and the variable Resource driver is not statistically significant. There-
fore, no support for H2 is found.
The interaction between knowledge-intensive activities and the mar-
ket-seeking driver has a positive impact on the likelihood of choos-
ing a captive governance mode (Model 5). Our results are statistically
significant, and we therefore find support for H3 (β= 0.811, p < 0.01).
The empirical evidence therefore suggests that market-seeking drivers
become primary determinants prompting firms to offshore knowl-
edge-intensive activities through a captive center; that is, the positive
influence knowledge-intensive activities have on the choice of captive
governance mode is strengthened when the driver-guiding service off-
shoring activities is related to market-seeking issues. By settling a crit-
ical function in a relevant foreign market, the firm enhances its repu-
tation with local customers (Contractor et al., 2010). In line with this,
activities involving company secrets should be kept in-house, and this is
the case of knowledge-intensive activities.
Finally, Model 6 in Table 4 includes all the interaction terms be-
tween the knowledge-intensive activities and the three offshoring dri-
vers. As can be observed, the estimated coefficient of the interaction be-
tween knowledge-intensive activities and cost-seeking driver is negative
and significant, the interaction between the variable “Knowledge-inten-
sive” and the variable “Resource driver” is nonsignificant, and the inter-
action between knowledge-intensive activities and the market-seeking
driver has a significant positive impact on the likelihood of choosing a
captive governance mode. Therefore, those results in Model 6 are quali-
tatively similar to those in models 3, 4 and 5, which include each inter-
action one by one.
To better interpret these results, we have plotted the fitted slope to
depict the interaction effect the cost driver has on the relationship be-
tween knowledge-intensive activities and the probability of choosing a
captive governance mode. In turn, Fig. 2 shows a negative relationship
between knowledge-intensive activities and the likelihood of a captive
governance mode when the importance of cost drivers is high.
We have further plotted the fitted slope to depict the interaction ef-
fect the market-seeking driver has on the relationship between knowl-
edge-intensive activities and the probability of choosing a captive gover-
nance mode (keeping the remaining variables constant at mean levels).
In Fig. 3, the interaction term between the market-seeking driver and
the type of activity (knowledge-intensive versus non-knowledge-inten-
sive) implies that the curve for knowledge-intensive activities is steeper
for high values of the market-seeking driver. Fig. 3 therefore shows
a positive relationship between knowledge-intensive activities and the
likelihood of a captive governance mode when the importance of mar-
ket-seeking drivers is high.
4.1. Robustness tests
Separate models have been estimated (see Table 5) to test whether
the offshoring drivers impact differently upon the governance mode
selected (captive offshoring versus offshore outsourcing) for knowl-
edge-intensive activities versus administrative activities. This enables us
to check whether the effect the offshoring drivers have on the choice
of governance mode differs between the two types of activities. The
new regression results are presented in Table 5. Our empirical evidence
shows that only in the case of cost and market-seeking drivers there is a
difference in the estimated coefficients between both subgroups of activ-
ities. We thus find that an internal governance mode is negatively asso-
ciated with cost drivers when offshoring knowledge-intensive activities.
These findings are in line with H1. In addition, the likelihood of adopt-
ing a captive governance mode when the type of activity offshored is
knowledge-intensive is strengthened when the driver is market-seeking.
The estimated coefficient shows a positive sign, and thus provides sup-
port for H3.
Finally, when interpreting interaction effects in terms of marginal ef-
fects in models with limited dependent variables (e.g., our logit model),
an important stream of research has stressed that the common prac-
tice of testing a moderating hypothesis on the basis of the sign and sig-
nificance of the coefficient in the interaction variable is incorrect, as









Results of the logistic regression model for firms currently offshoring.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Coeff. S.E. Sig. Coeff. S.E. Sig. Coeff. S.E. Sig. Coeff. S.E. Sig. Coeff. S.E. Sig. Coeff. S.E. Sig.
Constant -2.704 0.914 *** -3.149 0.928 *** -3.173 0.910 *** -3.218 0.932 *** -3.157 0.931 *** -3.181 0.915 ***
Knowledge-intensive – – 0.649 0.289 ** 0.636 0.286 ** 0.648 0.286 ** 0.550 0.300 * 0.578 0.299 *
Cost driver – – -0.007 0.132 0.181 0.146 -0.006 0.130 0.025 0.132 0.207 0.146
Knowledge-intensive x Cost driver – – – – -0.611 0.218 *** – – – – -0.666 0.240 ***
Resource driver – – -0.080 0.148 -0.054 0.150 -0.147 0.176 -0.057 0.153 -0.030 0.172
Knowledge-intensive x Resource driver – – – – – – 0.201 0.218 – – -0.002 0.232
Market-seeking driver – – 0.291 0.190 0.270 0.184 0.298 0.186 0.114 0.195 0.103 0.199
Knowledge-intensive x Market-seeking driver – – – – – – – – 0.811 0.301 *** 0.856 0.339 **
Size 0.211 0.075 *** 0.236 0.079 *** 0.226 0.079 *** 0.237 0.079 *** 0.238 0.081 *** 0.227 0.081 ***
Cultural distance -0.177 0.137 -0.178 0.132 -0.163 0.135 -0.178 0.133 -0.209 0.131 -0.191 0.133
Experience in offshoring 0.038 0.039 0.021 0.040 0.016 0.040 0.022 0.039 0.023 0.038 0.019 0.039
Age of offshoring implementation 0.044 0.030 0.052 0.031 * 0.053 0.032 * 0.054 0.031 * 0.050 0.029 * 0.053 0.031 *
Industry:
Finance -0.462 0.693 -0.421 0.691 -0.486 0.689 -0.371 0.697 -0.398 0.681 -0.442 0.680
Manufacturing 0.335 0.562 0.380 0.572 0.359 0.565 0.415 0.574 0.358 0.564 0.334 0.558
Professional services 1.558 0.701 ** 1.434 0.668 ** 1.413 0.680 ** 1.446 0.671 ** 1.322 0.659 ** 1.338 0.669 **
Retailing -0.305 0.837 -0.126 0.858 -0.180 0.859 -0.078 0.865 -0.027 0.889 -0.071 0.861
Software 1.965 0.682 *** 1.939 0.737 *** 1.998 0.733 *** 1.998 0.731 *** 2.084 0.728 *** 2.129 0.717 ***
Technical services 1.433 0.581 ** 1.499 0.557 *** 1.409 0.563 ** 1.539 0.559 *** 1.456 0.540 *** 1.361 0.541 **
Government, media, transportation, other – – – – – – – – – – – –
Location:
Africa 0.018 0.893 0.388 0.769 0.553 0.792 0.379 0.772 0.370 0.750 0.523 0.777
Asia 0.582 0.599 0.707 0.589 0.702 0.610 0.694 0.598 0.731 0.603 0.738 0.633
Australia -1.696 1.121 -1.319 1.124 -1.285 1.121 -1.282 1.122 -1.289 1.122 -1.244 1.124
Canada -0.514 0.947 -0.369 0.925 -0.219 0.964 -0.386 0.937 -0.276 0.914 -0.110 0.956
China 0.274 0.511 0.305 0.512 0.459 0.514 0.304 0.514 0.328 0.515 0.491 0.522
Eastern Europe 0.106 0.429 0.265 0.418 0.388 0.418 0.269 0.419 0.218 0.417 0.345 0.415
India -0.539 0.407 -0.333 0.402 -0.226 0.410 -0.332 0.406 -0.340 0.404 -0.233 0.413
Latin America -0.300 0.574 -0.033 0.567 0.070 0.578 -0.020 0.571 0.045 0.582 0.146 0.582
Middle East 0.511 1.009 0.437 0.971 0.546 0.975 0.439 0.957 0.587 1.015 0.694 0.988
Philippines -0.545 0.578 -0.290 0.587 -0.188 0.581 -0.267 0.584 -0.270 0.582 -0.162 0.571
Russia -0.231 0.950 -0.166 0.874 -0.065 0.817 -0.212 0.843 -0.202 0.866 -0.129 0.816
United States -0.132 0.705 -0.077 0.684 -0.014 0.670 -0.064 0.695 0.078 0.707 0.159 0.700
Western Europe – – – – – – – – – – – –
Home country
United Kingdom 0.328 1.256 0.419 1.263 0.377 1.314 0.392 1.264 0.538 1.262 0.497 1.312
Spain 1.317 1.134 1.555 1.057 1.457 1.087 1.584 1.064 1.656 1.110 1.526 1.133
Scandinavia 1.534 0.794 * 1.705 0.800 ** 1.691 0.852 ** 1.749 0.794 ** 1.975 0.767 *** 1.919 0.803 **
Netherlands 1.290 0.628 ** 1.275 0.660 * 1.124 0.649 * 1.280 0.661 * 1.337 0.641 ** 1.192 0.629 *
Belgium 2.175 0.612 *** 2.053 0.571 *** 2.030 0.584 *** 2.042 0.576 *** 1.995 0.580 *** 1.962 0.590 ***
United States – – – – – – – – – – – –
Log-likelihood -363.544 -353.594 -349.405 -353.053 -348.437 -344.315
Likelihood ratio (χ2 test) 79.93*** 94.41*** 98.96*** 96.79*** 97.23*** 99.51***
No. of observations 664 664 644 664 664 664
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Fig. 2. Moderating effect of importance of cost driver. Source: ORN dataset.
Fig. 3. Moderating effect of importance of market-seeking driver. Source: ORN dataset.
fect in such models (Ai and Norton, 2003; Norton et al., 2004; Cor-
nelißen & Sonderhof, 2009; Hoetker, 2007; Wiersema and Bowen, 2009;
Zelner, 2009). Since our focus is on the difference in the driver's mar-
ginal effect on the conditional probability that the captive mode equals
1 between knowledge-intensive and non-knowledge-intensive activities,
we have resolved this issue by rerunning the logit model and cal-
culating the cross-partial derivative effect as this derivative's average
over all the observations in the dataset; that is, for each observation
we have calculated the change in the conditional probability that the
captive mode is 1 for a change in the corresponding driver (cost, re-
source, or market-seeking driver) as the dummy variable collecting
knowledge-intensive activities changes from zero to one. The results ob-
tained are indicated in Table 6. The mean interaction effect is nega-
tive (positive) and statistically significant for the cost (market-seeking)
driver, confirming H1 and H3, respectively. For instance, the average
change in the predicted conditional probability that the captive mode
equals 1 for a one-unit increase in the cost driver variable differs be-
tween knowledge-intensive and non-knowledge-intensive activities by
−11.2% points, with knowledge-intensive activities on average having
lower marginal effects on the likelihood of choosing a captive gover-
nance mode in step with a higher cost driver. In contrast, the mean
marginal effect of the interaction term between knowledge-intensive ac-
tivities and the resource driver is non-significant. Finally, the average
change in the predicted conditional probability that the captive mode
equals 1 for a one-unit increase in the market-seeking driver variable
differs between knowledge-intensive and non-knowledge-intensive ac
Table 5
Results of the logistic regression model by subsamples (knowledge-intensive activities ver-
sus non knowledge-intensive activities). Full sample.
Panel A: Non knowledge-intensive activities
Coeff. S.E. Sig.
Constant − 3.132 1.058 ***
Cost driver 0.229 0.156
Resource driver − 0.051 0.175
Market-seeking driver 0.119 0.202
Size 0.274 0.087 **
Cultural distance − 0.169 0.149
Experience in offshoring 0.014 0.043
Age of implementation 0.055 0.033 *
Panel B: Knowledge-intensive activities
Constant − 4.417 2.049 **
Cost driver − 0.784 0.412 *
Resource driver 0.164 0.262
Market seeking driver 0.720 0.304 **
Size 0.217 0.116 *
Cultural distance − 0.263 0.230
Experience in offshoring − 0.018 0.075
Age of implementation
Chi2-tests of equality of estimated coefficients:
Cost Driver Panel A = Cost Driver Panel B
Chi2 statistic (Prob>Chi2) 7.69 (0.0055) ***
Resource Driver Panel A = Resource Driver Panel B
Chi2 statistic (Prob>Chi2) 0.00 (0.9923)
Market-seeking Driver Panel A = Market-seeking
Driver Panel B
Chi2 statistic (Prob>Chi2) 6.39 (0.0115) ***
Notes: (i) Source: ORN dataset; ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively; (ii) “S.E.” = Standard error; (iii) The model include industry
and offshoring location dummies as control variables; (iv) to save space, the estimated
coefficients on the control variables and the results of the tests of joint significance are not
reported.
Table 6




Mean cross-partial derivative effect
for cost driver
− 0.112 0.036 − 0.155 − 0.013
z-statistic of interaction effect − 2.149 0.593 − 3.822 − 0.730
Mean cross-partial derivative effect
for resource driver
0.036 0.011 0.004 0.049
z-statistic of interaction effect 0.847 0.100 0.530 0.991
Mean cross-partial derivative effect
for market seeking driver
0.132 0.063 0.005 0.220
z-statistic of interaction effect 1.843 0.701 0.249 3.433
tivities by 13.2% points, with knowledge-intensive activities on average
having higher marginal effects with the market-seeking driver. This new
empirical evidence confirms the results shown in the previous empirical
analyses.
5. Discussion and conclusions
The literature suggests there has been a progression in offshoring,
which is increasingly moving into value-added activities. Nowadays,
firms offshore not only manufacturing operations and standardized ser-
vices (labor-intensive activities) but also knowledge-intensive activities
(Jensen et al., 2013; Lewin and Peters, 2006; Linares-Navarro et al.,
2014). As activities become more knowledge-intensive, the preference
for captive offshoring increases. We confirm this in our study, and it is
also in line with previous research (Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011). We
also explore the role of drivers in this decision.
Consistent with internationalization research, offshoring is a strate-
gic practice that may help companies to add value, as it is an attractive
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and enter new markets. The literature posits that the reasons for off-
shoring have evolved from simply reducing costs to seeking growth op-
portunities or innovation capabilities (Bunyaratavej et al., 2011; Lewin
and Peters, 2006; Roza et al., 2011). For example, based on the re-
source-based view of the firm, organizational knowledge and processes
that cannot be observed nor imitated are sources of competitive advan-
tage and make a major contribution to firm performance (Lewin et al.,
2009b). Based on the market-based view, speed to market is also a key
reason to offshore. In addition to the considerable interest in drivers, the
choice of a suitable governance mode is another key issue regarding the
offshoring phenomenon (Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011; Luo et al., 2013)
by typically distinguishing between captive offshoring, which repre-
sents an internal governance mode, and offshore outsourcing, which de-
scribes an external governance mode (Contractor et al., 2010; Kuntz and
Roberts, 2014). Our study analyzes how drivers moderate the relation-
ship between offshoring knowledge-intensive activities and the prefer-
ence for a captive governance mode.
As previously discussed, and based on previous literature, costs are
always important in the offshoring decision. In particular, our results
show that when offshoring knowledge-intensive activities with the aim
of reducing costs, the cost driver clearly prompts companies to offshore
outsource. Nevertheless, when other drivers, such as market-seeking
reasons, dominate the decision to offshore knowledge intensive activi-
ties, it confirms that this type of driver encourages firms to implement
captive offshoring. Our results therefore suggest that market-seeking
drivers are important moderators with a positive influence on the choice
of a captive offshoring mode when a company offshores knowledge-in-
tensive activities, whereas choosing this internal governance mode is
not such a clear decision for offshoring when companies are driven by
cost reduction.
Taking into account the previous considerations, the following issues
should be highlighted. Firstly, offshoring knowledge-intensive activities
will better meet the company's market-seeking objective when it is im-
plemented through an internal governance mode rather than through
an external one. The captive offshoring mode will enable a company to
be close to the customers to gain access to new markets, while at the
same time safeguarding and exploiting internal know-how without hav-
ing to rely on external providers (Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011; Luo et
al., 2013).
Secondly, companies might search for resources via an offshore out-
sourcing mode, and thereby use their external suppliers to find the nec-
essary resources (Dickson et al., 2006). Offshore outsourcing helps com-
panies to gain flexibility, allowing them to easily switch between coun-
tries and suppliers, and making them less committed to specific tech-
nologies. Offshore outsourcing is source of talent but also of diverse
ideas needed in the innovation process. However, although quality and
trust may influence firms’ ability to seek outside help and outsource
knowledge-intensive functions, the moderating effect of resource drivers
on the relationship between knowledge-intensive activities and the use
of a captive governance mode is not significant. As we discussed be-
fore, there is also a force in the opposed direction: Firms can be afraid
to loose distinctive tacit knowledge by using external provider talent.
We claim that current co-evolution of offshoring practices and service
providers may support the validity of the former arguments, but our
data is already not so recent and perhaps we are just seeing a transition
from one to the other direction in the moderating factor. We conjecture
that newer data may support our hypothesis as established in this paper.
Furthermore, we have found that cost drivers weaken the positive
impact of offshoring knowledge-intensive activities on the choice of
a captive mode, which demonstrates the idiosyncratic nature of off-
shoring knowledge-intensive activities driven by costs. In particular,
firms may be sensitive insofar as the captive solution might introduce
higher costs than the outsourcing one, as well as because of the invest
ments required to acquire or establish a foreign subsidiary
(Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011). As a result, we contribute to an under-
standing of the decision-making process in companies offshoring knowl-
edge-intensive activities depending on their motivations. If a company
decides to offshore knowledge-intensive activities in order to reduce
costs over other drivers, the company should offshore outsource the ac-
tivity. If, however, the company's aim is to develop new markets, it
should implement a captive offshoring strategy.
Consistent with all these premises, the aim of this paper has been
to provide an integrative framework by examining how the different
drivers that impel firms to offshore services may impact on the rela-
tionship between the nature of the activity being offshored, specifically
knowledge-intensive activities, and the use of a particular governance
mode. Taking the company perspective into consideration and the rea-
sons behind implementing an offshoring strategy, this relationship may
be stronger or weaker. We have thus examined the effect that cost re-
duction together with more strategic drivers, such as the need to access
new markets and resources, has on the relocation of operations by dis-
tinguishing between captive offshoring and offshore outsourcing.
This paper has several implications for international business litera-
ture by contributing to the field in several ways.
First, we develop a multiple theoretical perspective when explain-
ing the choice of the offshoring governance mode, as has been sug-
gested in the offshoring literature (Brouthers, 2002; Elia et al., 2018;
Madhok, 1997), by developing a framework to understand the moder-
ating effect drivers have on the choice of governance mode when off-
shoring knowledge-intensive activities, based on both theoretical argu-
ments and empirical results. Given that sourcing activities from out-
side the home country is a challenging, risky, and complex decision for
firms (Mukherjee et al., 2013), our study has provided new theoreti-
cal and empirical evidence on certain specific factors that are crucial
for choosing an appropriate governance mode. Our work stresses that
firms should choose different governance modes (“how”) for the activi-
ties they offshore depending on the nature of the activity (“what”), with
this relationship being influenced by their primary motivations (“why”).
On the one hand, when a company offshores its knowledge-intensive
activities it seems it should choose a captive governance mode. This
is consistent with conventional wisdom and existing literature (Lewin
et al., 2009b), as these types of activities are at the core of compet-
itive advantage and should be kept under tight control. On the other
hand, if the company is driven by market-seeking reasons, our empiri-
cal analysis shows that the relationship is stronger. When the search for
cost savings is a pivotal reason for offshoring knowledge-intensive ac-
tivities, the company should choose an external governance mode (off-
shore outsourcing) (Caniato et al., 2015; Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011).
In line with this, our study shows that not only do companies con-
tinue to be motivated by traditional cost drivers when deciding to off-
shore knowledge-intensive activities, but they also offshore in response
to market-seeking drivers, and in this latter case they prefer a captive
governance mode.
Second, this work contributes to the offshoring practice from a man-
agerial and practitioner perspective, by proposing that it is not only
function-specific characteristics per se, such as the distinction between
administrative activities and knowledge-intensive activities that should
influence the decision on the choice of governance mode. Thus, we ex-
tend the state-of-the-art by showing that offshoring drivers may influ-
ence the relationship between the nature of the activity and the choice
of governance mode. We report that offshoring knowledge-intensive ac-
tivities, which implies transactions related to more specialized intan-
gible assets such as qualified human resources or know-how (Luo et
al., 2013), prompts firms to adopt a captive mode when market-seek-
ing drivers are the key motivators. Furthermore, the role of cost dri-
vers as a primary determinant for offshoring is also vital for under-
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positive relationship between knowledge-intensive activities and a cap-
tive governance mode is weaker when firms decide to offshore for
cost reasons. This finding has important practical implications for man-
agers because they have to choose the governance mode considering
not only the type of activity being offshored but also the type of dri-
ver or motivator to ensure their companies’ objectives are more suc-
cessfully achieved. Therefore, before implementing services, offshoring
firms should learn to identify the criteria for selecting the more ap-
propriate governance mode based on these unique aspects
(Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011).
As a result, from a practical perspective, managers should be aware
that their company's reasons for offshoring moderate the choice of gov-
ernance mode. Specifically, depending on the type of activity and what
they are looking for with each implementation, companies should select
an internal or an external governance mode.
Third, we provide a better understanding of the offshoring of ser-
vices. While offshoring research in the manufacturing context has pre-
vailed over the years, a growing body of literature highlights the need
to identify different offshored activities, and more specifically the de-
cision to offshore services has increasingly attracted scholarly attention
in recent years (e.g., Caniato et al., 2015; Elia et al., 2014; Jensen and
Petersen, 2013; Lewin and Volberda, 2011). As Pisani and Ricart (2016,
p. 386, 418) have recently pointed out: “offshoring of services (OS)
represents a remarkable economic and social phenomenon in the inter-
national business (IB) scenario” and “much work remains for those IB
scholars interested in this multifaceted phenomenon, which is expected
to affect firms’ cross-border activities to an even greater extent in up-
coming years”. Service activities have traditionally been characterized
as possessing a high proportion of intangible components that are dif-
ficult to express, making the specification complicated. The question is,
therefore, how to offshore a service that is difficult to define. Some ser-
vices require customer involvement, so facilitating it in real time and
across distances is an immediate challenge for offshoring. Service qual-
ity is also an important concern, so when services are complex and
vaguely defined, their processes cannot be standardized, as they require
complicated judgements involving implicit knowledge, with steps in the
process being reciprocal, making offshoring more challenging (Gleich et
al., 2017; Stringfellow et al., 2008).
Our study therefore provides a guide for scholars and managers de-
signed to stimulate the success of their offshoring implementations by
understanding the phenomenon from a co-evolutionary perspective.
6. Limitations and future research
While our study's findings have important implications for the the-
ory and practice of international management, as with all studies it has
a number of limitations.
First, studies on offshoring have identified certain trends. As de-
scribed in our study, the phenomenon started with the offshoring of
highly operative and transaction-oriented activities, but has since been
moving rapidly into heavily knowledge-based activities. Driven by cost
efficiencies, many companies have been gaining more experience in off-
shoring, while at the same time encountering coordination and gover-
nance problems (Sidhu and Volberda, 2011), often exacerbated by the
lack of a clear corporate strategy. The consequence has been what is
called the efficiency trap (Lewin et al., 2011; Paz-Aparicio and Ricart,
2013), as companies driven by the search for efficiencies become en-
tangled in increasingly complex situations, giving rise to major in-
efficiencies. From this perspective, mention should be made of the
costs of managing and coordinating interdependent activities in differ-
ent time, language and cultural zones (Asmussen et al., 2016; Sidhu and
Volberda, 2011), referred to as “hidden” or “invisible” costs (Andersson
and Pedersen, 2010; Larsen et al., 2013; Manning et al., 2011). For theo-
retical and managerial purposes, it would be interesting to measure this
effect and analyze how this type of costs could also affect the relation-
ship between the nature of the activity being offshored and the choice
of governance mode.
Second, and in line with this last research stream, companies gain
experience in offshoring, and eventually learn how to avoid the effi-
ciency trap. In addition, service providers are also learning and grow-
ing closer to companies with additional onshore resources. The outcome
of these two processes is an increase in trust and an improvement in
information technology and governance capabilities, all of which lead
to greater outsourcing and offshoring in a twin search for lower costs
and better talent. This means that offshoring decisions evolve based
on the experience and evolution of both the company and the service
providers. It would be interesting to empirically test how this trend af-
fects the choice of governance mode.
Finally, as previously commented, property rights systems and other
legal frameworks in a host country appear to be increasingly relevant to
the choice of offshoring governance mode. Despite this, due to the lack
of data in our dataset, the best we could do was to include dummies that
control for the countries of destination.
The following points also address certain lines of future research.
Our study has sought to improve our understanding of the evolution
of the offshoring phenomenon and the relationship between offshoring
knowledge-intensive activities and the choice of governance mode by
considering the moderating role of drivers. An important piece that is
still missing refers to “when” companies decide to offshore value ac-
tivities. Some companies initiate offshoring earlier than others, and it
would be interesting to understand why. Moreover, an additional line
of research could involve the joint analysis of the impact that drivers
and perceived risks have on offshoring. The reasons for offshoring are
key topics in prior research (Lewin et al., 2009b), but to our knowl-
edge there are few studies examining the risks of offshoring decisions
(e.g., Manning, 2014; R. Mudambi and Tallman, 2010; S.M. Mudambi
and Tallman, 2010). Likewise, another line of research could be to con-
sider the effect of external factors, such as the legal system, on the off-
shoring phenomenon. It may provide a fruitful avenue for advancing
our knowledge in this field. Future research might therefore comple-
ment our analysis and extend our knowledge on offshoring as a major
economic and social phenomenon.
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Dummy variable equal to 1 if the function offshored involves engineer-
ing services, R&D, or product design.
Cost dri-
ver
Category of offshoring motivations featuring cost drivers (Other cost
savings, labor cost savings)
Resource
driver
Category of offshoring motivations featuring resource drivers (Business





Category of offshoring motivations featuring market-seeking drivers
(Increasing speed to market, access to new markets, part of a larger
global strategy, and differentiation strategy)




Home-host cultural distance (5-point Likert scale based on the ques-
tion: “How important are cultural differences with employees in off-










Years from the launch of the firm's first offshoring project to the focal
implementation
Industry Industry dummies (finance and insurance, government, manufacturing,
media, professional services, retail, software, technical services, and
transportation)
Location Offshoring location dummies (Africa, Asia, Australia, Canada, China,
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Home country location dummies (United States, Belgium, Netherlands,
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